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Remigiusz ROSICKI
Poznañ
Poland’s Gas Security
Abstract: The subject matter analyzed in the text is Poland’s energy security as illustrated with the secu-
rity of gas supply (gas supply security). The text analyzes a selection of problems concerned with gas se-
curity and so the focus is on: (1) a description of gas supply contracts, and (2) an assessment of gas
supply security with regard to the technical import capabilities of the transmission infrastructure. In both
cases two time-frames were applied: (1) 2006–2010, (2) the period after 2010 with a prospect for 2022.
The text goes on to verify the following questions: (1) In what scope was real action undertaken in order
to strengthen the security of gas supply to Poland in the years 2006–2010?, (2) How have the technical
and real capabilities to diversify the gas supply to Poland changed after 2010?
Key words: gas security, energy security, energy policy, Poland’s energy security
Introduction
T
he problem addressed in the text is concerned with the energy security of Po-
land, as exemplified by gas supply security. The gas problem has been the most
heavily discussed issue within the discourse on the state’s energy security. This is-
sue has also been exploited instrumentally during election campaigns – in elections
to the Sejm and Senat as well as in presidential elections (in many terms of office).
A threat to gas supply has always been related to the criticism of Poland’s depend-
ence on the supplies from the “eastern direction” (i.e. the Russian Federation). The
criticism has applied to both the conduct of particular governments responsible for
concluding the “Yamal Contract” itself (a Polish-Russian long-term natural gas
agreement, PGNiG-GAZPROM), as well as to particular annexes to the main con-
tract. Another issue that came under criticism in the discourse on energy security
was the lack of infrastructure that would facilitate a real and technical ability to im-
plement the gas supply diversification called for by politicians and specialists.
Energy security can be considered from various perspectives and in the scheme of di-
verse disciplines (Cherp, Jewell, 2011, p. 202–212). Still, it is hard to single out autono-
mous problems with surgical precision, and instead it should be stated that the burden of
energy security, the burden of analyses, etc. follows from the provenance of the scholarly
discipline represented by a given researcher. The problem of gas supply security can also
be examined against the backdrop of various perspectives, ranging from a political one,
through a technical one, an environmental one, to an economic one. The activity related to
the transmission, distribution and storage of gas requires technical capabilities. Hence,
the very discourse on the necessity to reduce the import dependence is of no use whatso-
ever if we do not possess technical capabilities that would allow a diversification of di-
rections and sources of energy supply. The same problem concerns the creation of
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a competitive market. It is impossible to increase competitiveness if transmission infra-
structure is lacking, and the nature of the sector entails a gamut of “barriers to entry”
(Rosicki, 2012, p. 1–3).
With a view to the analysis of gas security, the text addresses the following questions:
(1) In what scope was real action undertaken in order to strengthen the security of gas sup-
ply to Poland in the years 2006–2010?, (2) How have the technical and real capabilities to
diversify the gas supply to Poland changed after 2010? In order to obtain answers to the
questions posed, a comparative analysis of two energy security prospects has been con-
ducted – the “old” one (spanning the years 2006–2010) and the “new” one (after 2010,
with a perspective of 2022). The analysis comprised two issues, to wit (1) an outline presen-
tation of the annexes to the “Yamal contract” (a natural gas supply agreement between Po-
land and Russia), and (2) an assessment of the action aimed at gas supply diversification.
Poland’s problem with gas supply emerged after the demise of the economic-military
system bonding the states of the Eastern Bloc. In the early 1990s (when the USSR was
formally still in operation) the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers pointed
to the necessity to promptly sign gas contracts with the USSR, as well as to the necessity
to find new export partners. Back then the transmission infrastructure on the eastern bor-
der enabled the import of 8 bn m3 of gas annually. The import accounted for only 65% of
Poland’s demand for gas. As regards the supply of gas, the transitional period consisted in
the transition from intergovernmental arrangements and transfer ruble-based settlements
to purchases based on market rules and payments made in convertible currencies. The
prices of gas imported from the “eastern direction” increased fourfold and remained
steady in 1992–1994. Towards the end of 1992 a Program of Poland’s Demand for Gas
until 2010was announced; it addressed the courses of action to be taken with a view to in-
creasing the level of energy security as far as diversification of gas supplies was con-
cerned (Zawisza, 2011, p. 13–76; Program, 1992). In 1993 under the economic and
political circumstances, an arrangement was made between the governments of Poland
and Russia, whereby a transit gas pipeline was to run across the territory of Poland to
Western Europe; it was supposed to consist of two lines with the target transfer capacity
of up to 65 bn m3 of natural gas per annum. Additionally, by 2010 the gas pipeline was to
provide Poland with the supplies of 13 bn m3 annually (M.P. 2011, No. 46, item 512). The
Polish-Belorussian leg was completed in 1999, and the projected transfer capacity was at-
tained in 2005. Among the factors affecting the conclusion of the arrangement one can
reckon: (1) a reduction in the gas supplies by Russia at the beginning of 1993, (2) fore-
casts estimating Poland’s demand for gas at 25–35 bn m3 in 2010, (3) increased costs of
other gas-related projects presented in the Program of 1992.
1. The old prospect of gas security
1.1. Gas contracts
For a long time now an issue of Poland’s reliance on the gas supplies from the “eastern
direction”, that is from the Russian Federation, has been running throughout the dis-
course on Poland’s energy security. The analyses have more often than not emphasized
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the threat resulting from the development of the transmission infrastructure by Gazprom,
which was supposed to cut off such countries as Ukraine, Belarus and Poland from gas
supply (Ostant, 2012, p. 154–173; Donaj, Kucenko, 2011, p. 335–350). In this context
there was some talk of the so-called “gas loop” that was supposed to be made up of the
transmission infrastructure of Nord Stream AG, South Stream Transport AG, OPAL NEL
TRANSPORT GmbH and NEL Gastransport GmbH (Ka³¹¿na, Rosicki, 2010, p. 177–182).
An example of the sense of threat concerned with Gazprom’s agreement with German
companies was the statement made in 2006 by R. Sikorski (Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Poland), who compared this agreement to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.
The official commissioning of the first line of Nord Stream in 2011 did not get a good
press either; the inauguration of the gas pipeline was attended by German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, French Prime Minister Francois
Fillon, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte and the European Commissioner for Energy
Günther Oettinger (PAP, 2011). Poland and the post-Soviet States (new members states
of the EU) were amazed to witness the shortsightedness of the politicians from the “old
EU member states”. The amazement was all the greater as there had been a number of gas
crises between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, that is in 2006, 2007, 2008 and par-
ticularly in 2009 (Szeptycki, 2008, p. 99–135). The doubts voiced by the European Com-
mission in 2010, concerned with the gas agreement between Germany and Russia were
regarded as an etiquette formula legitimizing the long-term contract for the supply of gas
by Nord Stream (PAP, 2010).
Attention should be drawn to the prospect of gas supply security, which was in force
in the aforesaid period. The structure of the gas supply to Poland was dominated by the
“eastern direction”; the supplies from GAZPROM accounted for more than 90%. More-
over, Poland was obliged to receive the Russian gas from 1996 to 2022. The year 2019
will also be crucial, for if neither party expresses a wish to terminate the contract, it will
be automatically renewed for another 5 years. Political and economic analyses do not find
the contract terms too favourable for Poland; the same applies to the effects of individual
renegotiations of the so-called “Yamal Contract”. The renegotiation agreement of Octo-
ber 2010 (the negotiations themselves lasted 2009–2010) may serve here as an example.
The negotiations took place in the context of another Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis, and
during another round of talks on the energy issues between the European Union and Rus-
sia. The effect of the contract was an annual increase in the gas supply of almost 2 bn m3
up to 2022. In 2006 Poland accepted unfavourable pricing terms, whereby the gas price
was to increase by 10% (Wyst¹pienie, 2012). These terms could not be changed in 2010.
It is estimated that Poland overpays for the gas supplies by 30%. For instance, at the be-
ginning of 2012 for a supply of 1000 m3 of gas Austria paid GAZPROM 397 USD,
France – 394 USD, Germany – 379 USD, Great Britain – 313 USD. It is remarkable that
the mean payment for 1000 m3 of gas among the EU member states was 430 USD,
whereas Poland paid 526 USD (that is 147 USD more than Germany, and 96 USD more
in relation to the mean price). Given the sum of 10 bn m3 of gas imported by agency,
a simple calculation shows that with the aforesaid cost Poland lost about 4 bn PLN an-
nually. It is to be noted that the cost of the Œwinoujœcie LNG terminal finalized at the
turn of 2014 and 2015 was to amount to 2.93 bn PLN, 32% of which was EU-funded
(Finansowanie, 2014).
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As a result of the renegotiations completed in 2010 an annexe to the 1996 Contract
was signed by PGNiG and Gazprom Export. The effect of the contract was an increase in
the annual volume of gas supply that now reached 10.24 bn m3 (by the Polish standard)
and was supposed to be continued until 2022. The annexe provided for a direct purchase
of gas in the following years, that is in 2010 up to 9.03 bn m3, in 2011 up to 9.77 m3, and in
the years 2012–2022 up to 10.24 bn m3. It should be noted that the annexe includes some
provisions allowing for gas re-export and price discounts, however these are trade secrets.
It was only estimated that the fixed preferential prices were to yield savings of 200–250
million USD in the years 2010–2014 (Aneks, 2010). The Supreme Audit Office has found
that PGNiG did not fully use its negotiating position in the arrangement-making process
with Gazprom Export in 2009–2010, which concerned the increase in the gas supply to
Poland as part of the Yamal Contract (Wyst¹pienie, 2012).
1.2. Evaluation of gas security
In the years 2006–2010 the index of energy dependence of Poland regarding all the
products rose by nearly 12%. The rising overall index is related to the decreasing coal
production (in that period the index of the dependence on imported solid fuels rose from
–21.7% to –5.2%), a steady and high level of crude oil import in relation to the domestic
production (in that period the dependence index for imported oil was more than 95%) and
the dependence index for imported gas, which by and large never went down [see Dia-
gram 1]. Given the plans to put some mines into liquidation on account of their
unprofitability, a rise in Poland’s import dependence is to be expected in the future. The
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Diagram 1. Index of import dependence for all products and for gas
in the years 2006–2010 (in percentage terms)
Source: Own study based on Eurostat data.
same problem will apply to the import of gas, which is linked with the predicted rise in the
demand for that fuel within 20 years.
The most widely discussed issue and fact are a high dependence on the gas imported
from the “eastern direction” [See Diagram 2]. Due to the series of successive annexes to
the “Yamal Contract”, the imported volume of this fuel has increased, while in the years
2006–2010 there were no real possibilities for supply diversification. The reasons for the
lack of real diversification in those years are: (1) a lack of proper infrastructure, (2) the
long-term contract with GAZPROM binding until 2022.
The negative assessment of the successive annexes to the “Yamal Contract” seems to
have little relevance to reality, that is to Poland’s actual bargaining power. Of crucial im-
portance are here two facts: (1) Polish-Russian relations that are anything but normal
(“political factors”), (2) a lack of infrastructure that would in technical and real terms se-
cure gas supply from other directions (“infrastructure factors”). In the latter case, the
years 1996–2009 should be assessed negatively as far as the activities of the Polish state
are concerned; Poland did not develop conditions favourably influencing the situation. It
is worth drawing attention to the technical capabilities to import gas to Poland in 2010
(though they are conditioned by the gas volume provided for in the “Yamal Contract”). In
that period the technical capabilities to import gas from the “eastern direction” accounted
for 91% (Drozdowicze + Vysokoye: 7.1 bn m3, SGT [Transit Gas Pipeline System]/Point
of Interconnection: 3.1 bn m3), whereas the remainder accounted for the western direction
(Lasów) [See Diagram 3].
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Diagram 2. Share of gas imported from Russia and Central Asian countries
in gas consumption in Poland in 2006–2010 (in percentage terms)
Source: own study and calculations based on the data obtained from the Ministry of Economy.
The “eastern direction” of gas supply was determined by the existing infrastructure;
even the negotiations conducted with Gazprom in 2010 could not be supported by the
possibilities for the import of a substantial volume of gas from other directions. This must
be viewed as Poland’s weakness during the gas negotiations with Russia. This state of af-
fairs results from the shortsightedness of the Polish authorities, as well as from a lack of
strategic reasoning in the previous years. From the 1990s onwards the problem was not
the lack of potential diversification routes, but the actual implementation of the principles
laying out their realization (Cf. Kwiatkiewicz, 2006, pp. 265–275). It must be noted that
the potential diversification routes were already pointed to in the Program of Poland’s
Demand for Gas until 2010 (Program, 1992). The price terms of the contract, in fact im-
posed by Gazprom, may of course be originally caused by the political sphere, however
the situation would be different if in the public interest a transmission infrastructure so
much needed on account of the gas supply diversification had been developed from the
1990s. A lack of action in this respect was in fact instrumental in supporting Gazprom’s
position of a gas supply monopolist. In the case of a monopoly, conditions set for con-
sumers (in this case Poland) are frequently unfavourable. In the period in question in the
political discourse more importance was attached to the unfavourable activities on the
part of the Russians rather than to the incompetence of the Polish entities responsible for
energy policy and security. Some were of the opinion that diversification is impossible,
and that we are doomed to the gas supply from the “eastern direction” (Kwiatkiewicz,
2008). However, such a mode of thinking about diversification appears to have been
caused by an erroneous economic analysis that made a fetish of the costs of expensive in-
frastructure projects, disregarding the perspective of the public interest and long-term
strategic planning. The “eastern direction” gas prices that were several dozen percent
higher might be converted into potential infrastructure investments made with the saved
money if effective diversification and gas market competition were introduced.
The development of energy policy and security has always been greatly impacted by
the planning and programming formula of these two aspects. The planning formula for
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Diagram 3. Poland’s technical import capabilities in 2010 (in percentage terms)
Source: Own study based on PGNiG and GAZ-SYSTEM data.
the energy policy was laid down in Chapter III of the Energy Law Act of 1997 (“Journal
of Laws” 1997, no. 54, item 348, as amended). There still remains the issue of the respon-
sibility of the Minister of Economy for the directions and the actual implementation of the
policy. The state’s energy policy is adopted by way of resolution by the Council of Minis-
ters every four years for the planning/prediction period of at least 20 years. Regarding its
legal status, the planning document is of low standing in comparison to other legal acts.
Hence, the capacity of the Minister of Economy with respect to the coordination of the
state’s energy policy is hindered because of the nature of the energy policy as a source of
law, as well as the lack of authoritative instruments influencing both consumers and en-
ergy companies (Cf. Czarnecka, Og³ódek, 2007, p. 325–363; Pawe³czyk, Pikiewicz,
2012, p. 430–482; Waligórski, 2008, p. 69–74). The development of planning and pro-
gramming capabilities entails a number of amendments to the Energy Law Act, e.g. con-
cerning successive responsibilities imposed upon energy companies.
2. A new prospect of gas security
2.1. Gas contracts
On 5 November 2012 PGNiG and GAZPROM concluded another annexe to the
“Yamal Contract”, thereby changing the price terms of the gas supply. The new price for-
mula was to bring about a price reduction of more than 10% with the “retroactive effect.”
The gas arrangement with GAZPROM provides for the “retroactive clause”, which
means that in the event of the parties agreeing on the new price formula or the proceed-
ings being concluded in favour of PGNiG, the new price shall be applicable the moment
the formal claim was submitted for the price to be changed. The adopted settlement
method substantially affected the EBITDA results of PGNiG – it was supposed to amount
to about 2.53 bn PLN. This in turn determined the level of the Polish company’s capital-
ization (Aneks, 2012; PAP, 2012). The annexe was to come into force provided that the
Polish party withdrew the plaint submitted to the Arbitration Tribunal in Stockholm.
PGNiG fulfilled this condition on the next day, 6 November 2012. The company received
a confirmation of the plaint withdrawal acknowledgment (Raport, 2012).
At the beginning of 2015 a problem concerning the settlements between PGNiG and
GAZPROM emerged. The arrangements provided for a price reduction, but in January
2015 the negotiations with GAZPROM were still in progress (it’s a general rule that the
negotiations may last for as long as 6 months). The Polish party pointed to the possibility
of handing the matter over to the Arbitration Tribunal. A probable cause of GAZPROM’s
delay in the resolution of this issue was an intention to demonstrate revenues, as in 2014
the company’s income dropped by around 35% (i.e. from approx. 24 bn USD down to
16 bn USD) in comparison to the previous year (Zysk, 2015).
2.2. Gas security assessment
The Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine in fact facilitated the acceptance of the
previously ignored Polish arguments concerning a threat to the gas supply security from
PP 1 ’15 Poland’s Gas Security 165
the “eastern direction” in the European Union; even the most devoted EU allies of the
Russian Federation lost their arguments. It became apparent that for political reasons
Russia is not a stable partner, and as a result viewpoints on necessary and additional in-
vestments in Central and Eastern Europe were redefined. It should be stressed that irre-
spective of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, in the European Union the year 2014 was
marked by the finalization of the market construction. Back then the EU member states
were to finalize the construction of the internal energy market, which was to be connected
with an electricity and gas transmission infrastructure linking all the member states
within one EU system. Towards the end of the year the European Commission deter-
mined to earmark 647 m EUR for the crucial infrastructure (PCIs – projects of common
interest) within the CEF (Connecting Europe Facility) financial instrument. It should be
noted that the CEF has secured 5.85 bn EUR for investments in the infrastructure of
trans-European energy networks until 2020 (COM/2011/665;Projects, 2015). The devel-
opment of a transmission infrastructure in Poland will completely change the situation
concerned with the gas supply security and diversification in the forthcoming years. In
the year of the “Yamal Contract” termination Poland will surely have a different negotiat-
ing position against GAZPROM, even if Russia continues to keep high gas prices due to
some “political factors”. With regard to the prediction of Poland’s increased demand for
gas, the volume of 10.2 bn m3 will still have to be secured by import. However, in the year
in question there will be a different proportion of technical capabilities to import gas – i.e.
from the “eastern direction” the volume will still be 10.2 bn m3, whereas all the other di-
rections will account for the total volume of 28 bn m3.
It is worth comparing the situation of 2016 with the situation of 2022 as far as the tech-
nical capabilities to import gas are concerned. Thus, we will get the big picture of the
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Diagram 4. Poland’s technical capabilities to import gas in 2016 (in percentage terms)
Source: Own study based on PGNiG and GAZ-SYSTEM data.
situation and of the scope of changes entailing due to the development of the gas infra-
structure in Poland. The choice of these time-frames is not fortuitous; in 2016 the LNG
Terminal will already be in operation, whereas 2022 will mark the operation of new in-
terconnections, inter alia Poland-Slovakia, Poland-Czech Republic (Hat) and Po-
land-Lithuania. When compared to 2010, the technical capabilities in 2016 will rise by
11.4 bn m3, and in 2022 they will in turn rise by 15.7 bn m3, attaining the total of
38.3 bn m3 [See Diagram 4 and 5] (Plan, 2014).
In 2016 the structure of the technical import capabilities will still be dominated by
the “eastern direction,” accounting for 45%, whereas the “western direction” (Lasów,
Malanów) will amount to 31% share [See Diagram 4]. From the perspective of an actual
increase in gas supply security in the event of a gas supply cut-off from the “eastern direc-
tion” (due to any factors whatsoever – “infrastructure-related” or “political” ones), of
great significance was the attainment of the technical capability of a physical reverse
flow, inter alia at the Poland-Germany point (SGT Malanów).
In 2022 the “eastern direction”, as part of the structure of technical import capabilities,
will account for 27%. The expansion of the transmission infrastructure in the “southern
direction” will be crucial; this direction will account for 33% share in the structure of the
technical import capabilities. With regard to the “southern direction” the following inter-
connections should be enumerated: Poland-Czech Republic (Hat) – 17%, Poland-Czech
Republic (Cieszyn) – 1%, Poland-Slovakia – 15% [See Diagram 5]. The infrastructural
development of this direction is connected with the project of the so-called “the
North-South Corridor,” which is intended to improve Poland’s gas supply security, but
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Diagram 5. Poland’s technical capabilities to import gas in 2022 (in percentage terms)
Source: Own study based on PGNiG and GAZ-SYSTEM data.
also to enable a construction of a more effective and competitive Poland-EU energy mar-
ket. This means that the Polish infrastructure will be prepared for a potential reception of
gas from the directions currently unavailable, i.e. from the LNG terminals located in the
Mediterranean Sea. As part of the plan to develop the GAZ-SYSTEM S.A. Transmission
System Operator, a construction of 2000-kilometre gas pipelines has been projected to be
completed by 2023 (Plan, 2014; Lista, 2015).
In 2014 Gaz-System S.A. presented predictions concerned with the development of
the domestic gas demand; three scenarios were considered. The first one was optimal – it
was developed taking into account the possibility and probability of the demand on the
part of specific clients/end users actually reaching the declared amount. The second sce-
nario – the moderate one – was delineated on the basis of the nominations for transmis-
sion contracts, additionally taking into account the gas volume following from the
contracts for a connection to the already-begun investments with a view to the construc-
tion of combined cycle units. The third scenario was based on the guidelines included in
the planning document The Energy Policy of Poland until 2030 (The Energy, 2009; Plan,
2014) [See Diagram 6].
It is interesting to note that the indicated predictions are concerned with the demand
for a transmission service within the context of the domestic gas demand. This means that
for the projection of the demand for transmission services provided with the aid of the do-
mestic system one still needs to take into account a transit transmission and the fuel ex-
port. There is no doubt that each of the scenarios demonstrates a year-over-year increase
in the domestic demand for gas. In the first prediction the demand increases up to
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25.5 bn m3, the second one – up to 18.9 bn m3, while the third one – up to 18.2 bn m3. The
first scenario shows the greatest increase, which means that it will be necessary to secure
the physical supply of gas to Poland [See Diagram 6] (Plan, 2014). Should this scenario
be fulfilled, new directions of gas supply would be needed, for the LNG Terminal will
cover more than 19.5% of the domestic demand and the supplies from the “eastern direc-
tion” will account for 40% (allowing for the maintenance of the technical capabilities to
import gas form the Russian Federation). As for the development of gas demand, the de-
termination of the Polish authorities regarding the introduction of low emission energy
generation (gas-fired power plants should be included) will be of great significance for
Poland. The analysis of the investment outlays on new generating capacities in the period
of 2014–2028, which were declared by energy companies, shows that nearly 40% of new
generating capacities will be related to gas (The Investment, 2014, p. 3 and the following
pages). Furthermore, the development of the chemical industry in Poland should be taken
into account, as it is the single greatest end user of gas.
Conclusion
It should be emphasized that the decade from 2010 will witness a process of strength-
ening Poland’s energy security concerned with the minimization of the risk of the gas
supply being discontinued. The main indicator here is the development of the transmis-
sion infrastructure in the domestic system as well as the construction of the internal en-
ergy market in the European Union. The text analyzes only a selection of problems
concerned with gas security, that is a study of gas contracts and an assessment of gas sup-
ply security with regard to the technical import capabilities of the transmission infrastruc-
ture. With a view to the analysis of the indicated issues, the text undertakes to verify the
following questions: (1) In what scope was real action undertaken in order to strengthen
the security of gas supply to Poland in the years 2006–2010?, (2) How have the technical
and real capabilities to diversify the gas supply to Poland changed after 2010?
1) It is hard to point to real action aimed at the diversification of gas supply to Po-
land in the years 2006–2009, which resulted in a weak negotiating position of Po-
land against GAZPROM in 2010. A negative assessment of the annexes to the
“Yamal Contract”, presented by politicians and some energy policy analysts, se-
ems to have no relevance to the actual negotiating possibilities of Poland. This
state of affairs was greatly shaped by factors of political and infrastructural nature.
It must also be stressed that if technical capabilities to diversify the supply had
been in place, little would have changed in the negotiations with GAZPROM over
lower prices of the supplied volume of gas. Still, the technical import capabilities
would have enabled the negotiation of the choice of extra volume of 2 bn m3
from another direction in 2010. It is worth stressing that in the years 2009–2014
investments were made with a view to the expansion of the gas pipelines by more
than 800 kilometres, and the construction of the LNG Terminal continued.
2) According to the Development Plan for the Current and Future Supply of Gase-
ous Fuels in 2014–2023 the technical import capabilities will be rising. It is esti-
mated that in 2022 the domestic transmission system will attain the transfer
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capacity (throughput) of 38.3 bn m3, the “eastern direction” accounting for 27%,
the “southern direction” – 33%, and the “western direction” – 18%. This means
that without the technical capabilities of the “eastern direction”, the domestic sys-
tem will still have the transfer capacity of 28.1 bn m3. Juxtaposing such a dimi-
nished transfer capacity with the optimal prediction outlined in the text [See
Diagram 6], it follows that Poland will eliminate the threat concerned with the
“energy blackmail” from the “eastern direction”. Also, the negotiating position of
Poland against Russia will change at the turn of 2022–2023. This will however
not eliminate the threat of an “energy blackmail” from the “eastern direction” tar-
geted at the whole of the European Union. Nevertheless, it must be noted that
physical reverse flows in the “western direction” have a substantially consolida-
ting effect on Poland’s gas security. Moreover, a number of other investments are
worth pointing out; among the ones that were not mentioned in the analysis are
the Baltic Pipe Project and a third storage tank of the LNG Terminal, which both
are relevant for the increase in the transfer capacity of the domestic gas system.
Poland’s energy security should also be considered within the context of the internal
energy market of the European Union. The context of the EU policy will significantly in-
fluence the gas security and individual member states in Central and Eastern Europe. The
termination of the “Yamal Contract” (2022) marks a new prospect for the climate and en-
ergy policy of the EU (2nd Climate and Energy Package), new goals as for the reduction in
GHG emissions, an increase in the share of RES in energy generation, increased energy
efficiency as well as a number of infrastructure-related investments (trans-European en-
ergy connections and crucial infrastructure). Infrastructure investments are particularly
bound to increase the possibilities for supply diversification, while they will introduce
greater competition in the EU gas market. Apparently, greater energy independence re-
quires the development of RES, not because RES are “green energy”, but because they do
not entail import dependence.
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Bezpieczeñstwo gazowe Polski
Summary
Przedmiotem analizy w tekœcie jest bezpieczeñstwo energetyczne Polski na przyk³adzie bez-
pieczeñstwa dostaw gazu (bezpieczeñstwo gazowe). W pracy podjêta zosta³a analiza jedynie wybranych
problemów bezpieczeñstwa gazowego, uwaga skupiona zosta³a na: 1) charakterystyce kontraktów
gazowych i 2) ocenie bezpieczeñstwa dostaw gazu ze wzglêdu na techniczne mo¿liwoœci importowe
infrastruktury przesy³owej. W obu przypadkach przyjêto dwie perspektywy czasowe: 1) 2006–2010,
2) okres po 2010 z prognoz¹ na rok 2022. W tekœcie podjêto siê zweryfikowania nastêpuj¹cych pytañ:
1) W jakim zakresie mieliœmy do czynienia z realnymi dzia³aniami wzmacniaj¹cymi bezpieczeñstwo
dostaw gazu do Polski w okresie 2006–2010? 2) Jak zmieniaj¹ siê techniczne i faktyczne mo¿liwoœci
dywersyfikacji dostaw gazu do Polski po roku 2010?
S³owa kluczowe: bezpieczeñstwo gazowe, bezpieczeñstwo energetyczne, polityka energetyczna, bez-
pieczeñstwo energetyczne Polski
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